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Abstract:
The abilities of managers in pension funds and, especially, in Socially Responsible (SR) pension funds have 
only rarely been investigated. Both standard pension funds and specialized SR funds are concerned with social 
welfare, but SR pension funds present a special interest of study. Various works show that SR managers usually 
underperform conventional funds because they focus on social aspects, although other studies find that SR funds 
overperform. In this work, the stock-picking and style timing abilities of UK conventional and SR equity pension 
fund managers are studied, examining whether SR pension funds implement different strategies and contribute to 
developing more socially responsible outcomes. Additionally, the influence of SR as a risk factor is introduced. 
As far as is known, style timing and the introduction of the SR risk factor have not been previously studied in 
the context of SR pension funds. The results indicate that both kinds of pension fund develop similar investment 
strategies, investing in small cap and growth values. Moreover, both funds present negative performance, poor/
negative stock-picking abilities, and perverse market timing abilities. SR managers exhibit superior style timing 
skills and are able to correctly time size and book-to-market strategies. The SR risk factor shows that SR pension 
funds have significantly positive loadings of this factor, which erodes their performance. Overall, none of the 
funds analyzed develop proper management, and the optimization of the risk-return binomial in SR funds may be 
constrained by SRI requirements.
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Resumen:
Las habilidades de los gestores de fondos de pensiones, especialmente de fondos socialmente responsables 
(SR), apenas han sido analizadas. Los fondos de pensiones y los fondos SR se preocupan por el bienestar social, 
por lo que el estudio de los fondos de pensiones SR presenta un interés especial. Diversos trabajos muestran 
que los gestores SR generalmente presentan una performance inferior a la de los fondos convencionales, ya que 
se centran en aspectos sociales; sin embargo, otros estudios muestran que estos presentan mejor performance. 
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En este trabajo se estudian las habilidades de selección de valores y sincronización de estilos de los gestores de 
fondos de pensiones de renta variable de Reino Unido, examinando si los fondos de pensiones SR implementan 
estrategias diferentes y contribuyen a formar pensiones socialmente responsables. Además, se introduce la res-
ponsabilidad social como factor de riesgo. Dado lo que me es conocido, la sincronización de estilos y el factor 
SR no han sido analizados previamente en fondos de pensiones SR. Los resultados indican que ambos fondos 
desarrollan estrategias similares, invirtiendo en empresas de pequeña capitalización y en crecimiento. Además, 
presentan una performance negativa, una habilidad de selección de valores pobre o negativa, y una habilidad de 
sincronización con el mercado negativa. Los gestores SR muestran mejor habilidad de sincronización en estilos, 
sincronizando correctamente estrategias tamaño y book-to-market. Los fondos de pensiones SR tienen un peso 
significativamente positivo en el factor SR, lo que erosiona su performance. En general, ninguno de los fondos 
analizados desarrolla una gestión adecuada, y la optimización del binomio riesgo-rentabilidad en fondos SR 
puede estar restringida por las exigencias de la inversión SR. 
Palabras clave:
Fondo de pensiones, selección, habilidad, sincronización, Reino Unido.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Globally, Socially Responsible Investment (SRI) has grown significantly over the past 
two decades. Although SRI can be defined in a variety of ways, the Social Investment Fo-
rum (SIF) (2001) specifies that SRI is “an investment process that considers the social and 
environmental consequences of investments, both positive and negative, within the context 
of rigorous financial analysis (Social Investment Forum 2001)”. Eurosif (2011) indicates 
that SRI is a concept that continues to evolve as both established and newer financial ser-
vices players develop new methods and approaches to the valuation and incorporation of 
environmental, social, and governance (ESG) issues in fund management.
This investment is based on the fact that consumers pay a premium for products and 
companies that are consistent with their personal values: environmental protection, human 
rights, labor relations…; these companies assume a responsibility towards society, the en-
vironment, and stakeholders in general. Investors avoid companies that may cause health 
hazards (alcohol, tobacco, gambling…) or exploit employees. This contrasts with the tra-
ditional view of maximizing value for the shareholders by considering purely financial 
aspects. Nonetheless, the SRI idea is based on both social welfare and value maximization.
Many studies have examined the performance of SR financial products, specifically SR 
mutual funds, but the empirical evidence of these analyses is mixed. Some authors state 
that there is no conflict between the two goals (financial and non-financial). The majority 
of SR mutual fund studies attain similar performance results to conventional fund studies 
(Camino and López 1995; Becchetti and Fucito 2000), and some works find superior re-
sults (Read 1999). However, other authors (Munnell 1983; Lamb 1991; Luther et al. 1992) 
posit that SRI involves a financial sacrifice, while still others, such as Domini et al. (1992), 
Waddock and Graves (1997) and Davis (1999), argue that ethical investment implies a 
premium.
Despite this, SRI has grown considerably in the last two decades, although its develop-
ment varies considerably from one country to another. European SRI reached €22.89 billion 
Euros in 2015, according to Eurosif (2016), and the United Kingdom (€4.5 billion), France 
(€3.7 billion) and the Netherlands (€3 billion) are the top three European countries in terms 
of SRI (Eurosif 2016). Furthermore, the UK fund management in SRI has experienced a 
remarkable growth in recent years, distinguishing their commitment to SRI in pension funds 
(Eurosif 2016). Specifically, in 2016, the UK Pensions Regulator included in its defined-con-
tribution pension scheme practice code that trustees may also consider non-financial factors 
in which pension participants share their concern.
This growth may be partly attributed to regulatory changes in relation to the disclosure 
of social, environmental, and ethical (SEE) information, and/or ethical, social, and corpo-
rate governance (ESG) information by pension funds and listed companies. For example, 
the United Kingdom was the first country to regulate the disclosure of the SEE investment 
policies of pension funds and charities, contributing considerably to the growth of the in-
dustry, especially occupational plans, as Clark and Hebb (2005) indicate.
However, SR practices are still developing in pension funds, and there is a progressive 
awareness of their importance. Pension funds are integrating extra-financial analysis into 
the decision-making process, with SR pension fund net assets representing 0.89% of the 
overall pension fund net assets at the end of 2009.
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The data shows that 65.3% of European SR assets are held by pension funds. However, 
98.1% (€3,161 billion) of these assets are held by public pension funds and 1.9% (€61 bil-
lion) by occupational pension plans (Hertrich 2011). Some evidence shows that corporate 
pension funds intend to expand their SR allocation; for example, in Spain, SRI has grown 
recently in the institutional market;, although it is only important in occupational pension 
funds, as Albareda and Balaguer (2009) explain. 
Given these circumstances, few studies have examined SR pension funds and there are 
conflicting views on SRI. Supporters argue that the practice has advantages for pension 
funds and the economy, because the wellbeing of many citizens depends on pension fund 
performance. Specifically, the concept is that pension funds are powerful institutional in-
vestors that may ensure economic stability and stable environmental, social and corporate 
governance conditions in the global economies. As a consequence, as Clark and Hebb 
(2005), Sethi (2005), and Hawley and Williams (2007) indicate, this stability leads to more 
prosperous economies and healthier financial returns for pension funds.
On the other hand, critics claim that non-financial criteria influence pension fund deci-
sion making and increase exposure to financial risks; that is, it is in conflict with fiduciary 
duty. Hoepner et al. (2011) conclude that pension fund fiduciary duties should not forbid 
ESG criteria in the investment process. Indeed, Eurosif (2011) explains that ESG criteria 
should be a part of fiduciary duty.
In this study, a sample of UK domestic equity pension funds is analyzed, dividing the 
sample into conventional and socially responsible pension funds. Specifically, their perfor-
mance and managerial skills (stock picking, market timing, and style timing) are compared 
(aspects rarely analyzed previously in SR pension funds). Indeed, as far as is known, this 
study presents the first comparative analysis of style timing abilities. Additionally, the in-
fluence of SR as a risk factor is introduced.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents a literature review, Sec-
tion 3 describes the methodology, Section 4 explains the data and results, and Section 5 
concludes.
2. LITERATURE REVIEW
Initially, the use of non-financial investment criteria was mainly based on religious 
beliefs, although it was marginal (Sparkes and Cowton 2004; Bengtsson 2008a, 2008b; 
Richardson and Cragg 2010). Today, many institutions (mutual funds, pension funds, 
governmental and non-governmental organizations) integrate SR in their investment 
strategies (Emel 2002; Gifford 2010; Derwall et al. 2011).
The majority of SR studies analyze SR mutual funds and most of them focus on the 
UK or the US. Luther et al. (1992), Mallin et al. (1995) and Gregory and Whittaker (2007) 
are based on the UK market. Goldreyer and Diltz (1999), Statman (2000) and Geczy et al. 
(2006) analyze the US market. Other works analyze other markets: Bauer et al. (2005), 
Kreandert et al. (2005) and Bauer et al. (2006) study the Australian case; Bauer et al. 
(2007) examine the Canadian market, and Renneboog et al. (2008) evaluate several other 
countries.
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However, SR pension fund studies are less common. This may be due to the debate on 
the appropriateness of including SR criteria in pension fund investment strategy. 
Proponents of SR pension funds cite a range of reasons. First, SR represents an invest-
ment strategy that delivers attractive risk-adjusted returns (Clark and Hebb 2005; Sethi 
2005; Kiernan 2007). Second, pension funds and other institutional investors own the ma-
jority of global financial assets and performance depends on financial markets. Hence, these 
institutions have an incentive to integrate any SR criteria that affect the world economy in 
their investment process (Hawley and Williams 2000, 2007; Amalric 2006; Thamotheram 
and Wildsmith 2007; Mattison et al. 2011). Third, pension funds should be responsible for 
societal well-being, as well as the natural environment, including them in their investment 
(Lydenberg 2007; Richardson 2008; Solomon 2009; Berry 2011).
Although the criticisms are minor, they point to several motives. First, SRI interferes 
in pension fund strategies and is financially risky (Entine 2005; Munnel and Sundén 
2005; Rounds 2005). In this sense, pension funds should only work for diversification and 
high-risk-adjusted return by investing according to the risk parameters of the investment 
policies (UNEP Finance Initiative 2005; Richardson 2007; Berry 2011). Despite this, as 
Solomon (2009) indicates, pension funds and other investment institutions need to appre-
ciate the value of engaging in an SRI strategy.
In this regard, Eurosif (2011) develops one of the first complete European studies on 
pension funds and responsible investment, explaining that SRI affects long-term perfor-
mance, and many pension funds feel that SRI policies are part of their fiduciary duty. This 
implies that some pension funds are lacking in their fiduciary duty by not having a SRI 
policy.
SR mutual fund studies usually focus on comparing performance with their counter-
parts, although the analysis of managers’ performance and skills is rare in SR pension 
funds. Only Ferruz et al. (2010) evaluate UK global equity pension funds (SR and conven-
tional), finding a slight stock picking ability of SR pension fund managers, and negative 
market timing ability of both SR and conventional managers. These authors also observe 
that, while conventional pension fund managers make certain use of superior information 
to follow stock-picking strategies, SR pension fund managers use superior information to 
follow market timing strategies.
Given this limited evidence, this study evaluates whether the SR managers of UK do-
mestic equity pension funds develop better performance and managerial skills than their 
counterparts. Additionally, the first comparative analysis of style timing abilities and the 
inclusion of SR style in pension funds are presented.
3. METHODOLOGY
3.1. Performance measure
To analyze the financial performance of SR and conventional pension funds, the CAPM 
model is applied:
          (1)
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Where: rit= Rit-Rft is the excess return of fund i at time t over the risk-free asset; rmt= 
Rmt-Rft is the excess benchmark return over the risk-free asset; β is the beta of the fund with 
the market, which represents the systematic risk; α0 is the CAPM-adjusted return of SR/
conventional pension fund portfolios; and εit is the error term. 
In the second stage, the 4-factor Carhart model (Carhart 1997) is applied. Some of the 
most recent papers about financial performance of SR mutual funds have implemented this 
methodology (Bauer et al. 2005; Bauer et al. 2006; Bauer et al. 2007; Kempf and Osthoff 
2007; Climent and Soriano 2011; Ferruz et al. 2012):
      (2)
Where: rit is the excess return of fund i in period t over the risk-free asset; rmt is the 
excess return of a representative market index over the risk-free asset in period t; SMB is 
the size factor; HML is the book-to-market factor2; and PR1YR represents the momentum 
factor. The European factors (SMB, HML, PR1YR) used are those developed by Fama and 
French3.
3.2. Traditional market timing models
Various models have been used in the financial literature to identify stock-picking and 
market timing abilities. Two of the most used are Treynor and Mazuy (TM) (1966) and 
Merton and Henriksson (MH) (1981) models. 
The Treynor and Mazuy (1966) model is expressed as follows:
   (3)
where: rit = Rit – Rft, and rmt = Rmt – Rft are the excess return of fund i and the excess 
market return over the risk-free asset f during the period t, respectively; α0 represents the 
stock-picking ability of the manager, that is, the ability to select securities that provide 
higher returns than others with the same level of non-diversifiable risk. A positive and 
significant alpha indicates correct stock-picking, and γ1 determines the market timing skill. 
If the gamma coefficient (γ1) is positive and significant, the manager has market timing 
ability; if γ1 is negative and significant, the timing ability is perverse.  Finally, εit is the term 
of the error and its expected value is zero.
The Merton and Henriksson (1981) model has the following expression: 
 (4)
Where: rit = Rit – Rft, and rmt = Rmt – Rft are the excess return of fund i and the 
market return over the risk-free asset f during the period t, respectively; α0 represents the 
stock-picking ability; γ1 measures the market timing ability;    is the 
2   A more detailed description can be found in Fama and French (1993).
3  Data available on the website of Fama and French: http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/
data_library.html#Developed
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payment of an option over the market portfolio with a strike price equal to the risk-free 
asset; and  εit is the error term.
3.3. Conditional market timing models
The two traditional timing models previously explained are unconditional models, in 
that they do not distinguish between the use of public information and superior informa-
tion, which means that any information correlated with future market returns is interpreted 
as privileged information. Additionally, these models assume that the alpha, beta, and gam-
ma coefficients do not vary over time. 
To overcome these assumptions, Ferson and Schadt (1966) and Ferson and Quian 
(2004) develop some conditional versions, distinguishing market timing based on public 
information from that based on superior information. 
The new version of the Treynor and Mazuy model (1966) includes certain lagged infor-
mation variables to control whether the manager has superior information:
      (5)
where zt-1 is a vector of public economic cycle information variables and can predict the 
market risk premium;                        controls the common time variation in the risk premium 
and the portfolio beta due to public information. 
Similarly, Ferson and Schadt (1996) and Ferson and Quian (2004) propose the condi-
tional version of the MH model:
      (6)
where                 captures the variability of the manager’s timing ability over the eco-
nomic cycle due to the use of public information.
In conditional models (5) and (6), the three information variables that represent the 
economic cycle are those used by Ferson and Schadt (1996), Christopherson et al. (1998), 
Cortez and Silva (2002) and Roy and Deb (2004), since these authors have proven their 
relevance in explaining returns on securities and bonds. Specifically:
- Return per dividend: calculated as the quotient between the dividends paid by MS-
CI-UK over the previous 12 months and the current index price.
- Time spread: calculated as the difference between the annualised return on the UK 
bond at 10 years and the Libor rate at 3 months.
- Short-term interest rate: represented by the Libor rate at 1 month.
3.4. Style timing models: multifactorial timing versions
In this section, the timing abilities with regard to market and specific factors/styles are 
analyzed. If a manager develops these skills, the manager would increase the importance 
of those styles, enhancing the performance of the portfolio.
For this purpose, Bollen and Busse (2001) take the multifactorial performance models 
of Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) and propose an extension of the TM model 
(1966), considering the factors of those models. The extension is carried out in Bollen and 
Busse (2001), as in the following formula:
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(7)
where the sum of j factors refers to the four factors of the Carhart (1997) model.
Then, Lu (2005) incorporates the Carhart factors in the TM (1966) model:   
  
(8)
This model assesses whether a pension fund manager increases (decreases) his/her risk 
exposure to a specific factor prior to the factor index increase (decrease). The fund return 
will be a convex function of the factor index return. A positive gamma coefficient indicates 
style timing ability with regard to this management style. 
 The Merton and Henriksson (1981) model is also extended by Lu (2005) to measure 
style timing:
    (9)
where: 
3.5. The SR risk factor
Renneboog et al. (2008) indicate that the underperformance found by some SR mu-
tual fund studies is due to two factors. First, models do not incorporate an SRI/ethical 
risk factor, so this factor may not be fully captured by the benchmarks (CAPM or Fa-
ma-French-Carhart factors). As a consequence, adding this factor to the four-factor model 
could improve the alphas of ethical/SR funds. 
Second, these authors argue that companies with high ethical standards may be over-
priced as a result of an ‘aversion to unethical/asocial corporate behavior’. This can lead to 
a situation in which SR investors claim to invest in SR firms, although they obtain lower 
returns. Rising demand may cause these firms to be priced above their fundamental value 
as ethical funds underperform the market.
To control for the potential style differences between SR and conventional pension 
funds, this factor is added to the four-factor model:
  (10)
Where: α is the five-factor alpha of pension funds; rtsr  captures the excess return of 
the SR index, β5 is the loading on the SR risk factor, and εit stands for the idiosyncratic 
return. rtsr can also be interpreted as a zero-investment spread that has a long position in SR 
pension funds and a short position in a risk-free deposit. The SR factor returns, following 
Renneboog et al. (2008), are measured by an SR equity index, the UK-FTSE 4 Good Index 
returns, in excess of the risk-free interest rate.
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4. DATA
The pension fund data is obtained from Thomson Reuters. The database consists of the 
monthly returns obtained for all private pension funds, both conventional (2410) and SR 
(145), registered for sale in the United Kingdom with a domestic equity investment loca-
tion, from January 1994 to September 2010.
Pension funds are required to include data for at least 24 months to ensure the consist-
ency of the analyses. All pension funds that existed for a period of at least 24 months within 
the time frame considered have been taken into account, regardless of whether or not they 
survived until September 2010. Therefore, the sample is free of survivorship bias that could 
lead to inaccurate results in financial performance analyses, according to Chegut et al. (2011). 
The risk-free asset and the market index are the monthly return of UK three-month 
Treasury Bills and the monthly total return of the FT All Share Index, respectively, ob-
tained from Gregory et al. (2013)4. Additionally, the UK-FTSE4Good Index is used as a 
market benchmark in model (10), considered as the SR risk factor.
Table 1 shows some summary statistics of the sample.
Table 1
Summary statisticsa
Mean Median Standard deviation Minimum Maximum
Conventional pension 
funds
0.0048 0.0104 0.4013 -0.9902 0.0456
SR pension funds 0.0037 0.0099 0.1780 -0.2010 0.0470
Market factor 0.0063 0.0121 0.0417 -0.1324 0.0994
Size factor (SMB) 0.0002 0.0009 0.0243 -0.0694 0.0931
Book-to-market 
factor (HML)
0.0057 0.0050 0.0253 -0.0957 0.1096
Momentum factor 
(PR1YR)
0.0093 0.0131 0.0454 -0.2596 0.1380
Ethical factor 0.0003 0.0078 0.0439 -0.1200 0.0917
aTable 1 shows the summary statistics (mean, median, standard deviation, minimum and maximum) of the con-
ventional pension fund return, the SR pension fund return, and the risk factor return (market, size, book-to-mar-
ket, momentum and ethical). 
Source: Own elaboration.
This table shows that conventional pension funds present a higher average return than 
the SR funds, but they also offer a higher dispersion and a considerable minimum value, 
while SR pension funds reach a superior maximum. Given this evidence, differences are 
expected in the empirical analysis.
4  Data obtained from Xfi Centre for Finance and Investment, University of Exeter:
http://business-school.exeter.ac.uk/research/areas/centres/xfi/research/famafrench/disclaimer/
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5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS
5.1. Performance results
The financial performance of conventional and SR pension funds is analyzed by imple-
menting the CAPM and Carhart models (models 1 and 2, respectively). The CAPM results 
for both pension funds are presented in Table 2. Additionally, this table shows the differ-
ence between the coefficients obtained for conventional and SR funds (the significance of 
these differences is tested with a mean-difference t-test).
The results of the CAPM model show that both types of pension fund perform worse 
than the market (significantly negative risk-adjusted alphas in conventional and SR pension 
funds). Additionally, the performance of SR pension funds is significantly lower (0.004) 
than the performance of their counterparts.
Table 2
Results of CAPM modelb
α0 β1 R
2 adj
Conventional pension funds -0.0011*** 0.9228*** 0.7058
(0.000) (0.000)
SR pension funds -0.0015*** 0.9306*** 0.6149
(0.000) (0.000)
Difference (conventional-SR) 0.0004** -0.0078
b Table 2 shows the fund average coefficients of the fund OLS estimation of the CAPM model, regression (1), for 
conventional and SR pension funds investing in UK domestic equity. The last row shows the coefficient differences 
between conventional and SR funds. The associated p-values are shown beneath the coefficients estimated in brackets. 
The R-squared adjusted (R2 adj) coefficient is also included for each model estimated. *, ** and *** indicate signifi-
cance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Source: Own elaboration.
The Carhart model results are displayed in Table 3. Results show that conventional 
and SR pension funds underperform the market (significantly negative alphas), although 
conventional funds obtain an inferior alpha (-0.0004 at 10% significance level). In relation 
to the investment styles, conventional and SR pension funds usually invest in small caps 
(significantly positive β2) and growth stocks (significantly negative β3). Similar results are 
found by Ferruz et al. (2012) in a US mutual fund sample, in which religious mutual funds 
usually invest in small caps. Moreover, both pension funds develop contrarian momentum 
strategies (significantly negative β
4
). These results reveal that conventional and SR pension 
funds develop similar strategies, leading to similar (and poor) performance results. Despite 
this, the style coefficient differences show that SR pension funds invest in small cap com-
panies and growth stocks to a greater extent, and their momentum strategies are even more 
opposite to the market.
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Table 3
Results of Carhart modelc
 α0 β1 β2 β3 β4 R2 adj
Conventio-
nal pension 
funds
-0.0009*** 0.9520*** 0.2396*** -0.0672*** -0.0063*** 0.7212
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SR pension 
funds
-0.0005** 0.9611*** 0.4391*** -0.1775*** -0.0510*** 0.7286
 (0.034) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Difference 
(conventio-
nal-SR)
-0.0004* -0.0091 -0.1995*** 0.1103** 0.0447***
cTable 3 shows the fund average OLS estimation of the Carhart model, regression (2), for conventional and SR 
pension funds with domestic equity investment registered for sale in the UK and their differences. α0 represents 
the alpha and the performance of the model, β1  represents the risk-market exposure, β2 is the size factor (SMB) 
coefficient, β3 is the book-to-market factor (HML) coefficient, and β4  is the momentum factor (PR1YR) coeffi-
cient. The associated p-values are shown beneath the coefficients estimated in brackets. The R-squared adjusted 
coefficient is also included for each of the models estimated. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% 
and 1% level, respectively.
Source: Own elaboration.
5.2. Stock-picking and market timing abilities
In this section, the stock-picking and market timing abilities are analyzed, showing the 
results of the traditional and conditional TM and MH models (expressions 3 to 6).
The results of the traditional models are shown in Table 4. Panels A and B collect the 
results of conventional and SR pension funds, respectively. Panel C shows the difference 
between the conventional and SR fund results (the significance is obtained by applying a 
mean difference t-test).
The traditional timing models show contradictory results. The traditional Treynor-Ma-
zuy model results show that conventional and SR pension fund managers develop incor-
rect stock-picking abilities (negative alpha coefficients in panels A and B). However, the 
Merton-Henriksson model results show positive stock-picking skill in conventional funds 
and absence of stock-picking in SR funds. Comparing conventional and SR funds, conven-
tional funds present superior stock-picking skills in both models (less negative and positive 
skill versus negative and no skill in TM and MH, respectively). On the other hand, both sets 
of pension fund managers time the market incorrectly, presenting perverse market timing 
abilities (significantly negative γ1 in panels A and B).
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Table 4
Results of traditional timing modelsd
α0 β1 γ1 R
2 adj
Panel A: conventional pension funds     
Traditional Treynor-Mazuy model -0.0003*** 0.9114*** -0.4455*** 0.7065
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Traditional Merton-Henriksson model 0.0007*** 0.9701*** -0.1129*** 0.7068
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel B: SR pension funds
Traditional Treynor-Mazuy model -0.0009*** 0.9209*** -0.3524*** 0.6753
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)
Traditional Merton-Henriksson model 0.0004 0.9806*** -0.1219*** 0.6760
 (0.229) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel C: Differences (conventional-SR)
TM 0.0006** -0.0095** -0.0931**
MH 0.0003** -0.0105 0.009
dTable 4 shows the fund average OLS estimation of the traditional Treynor-Mazuy and Merton-Henriksson models, regres-
sions (3) and (4), for conventional pension funds (panel A) and SR pension funds (panel B) with domestic equity investment 
registered for sale in the UK. α0 represents the stock picking ability; β1 represents the risk-market exposure; and γ1 measures 
the market timing ability. Panel C shows the coefficient differences between conventional and SR pension funds. The as-
sociated p-values are shown beneath the coefficients estimated in brackets. The R-squared adjusted coefficient is also 
included for each of the models estimated.  *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Source: Own elaboration.
The results of the conditional timing models are shown in Table 5. Panels A and B show the 
results of the conventional and SR pension funds, respectively. Panel C shows the coefficient 
differences between both pension funds (the significance of the differences is obtained with a 
mean difference t-test).
The results of the conditional timing models (Table 5) support the ambiguous stock-picking 
results found in the traditional timing models (Table 4). Despite this, Table 5 shows that con-
ventional funds display better stock-picking skill than SR funds (less negative selectivity ability 
in the conditional-TM model and positive skill in the conditional-MH model). Furthermore, the 
negative market timing skill previously found persists in conventional and SR pension funds. 
The small difference between the traditional and conditional model results reveals that man-
agers either do not use superior information to improve their results, or they do so incorrectly.
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Table 5
Results of conditional timing modelse
 α0 β1 γ1 R2 adj
Panel A: conventional pension funds
Conditional Treynor-Mazuy model -0.0007*** 0.9368*** -0.5368*** 0.7105
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Conditional Merton-Henriksson model 0.0003*** 0.9889*** -0.1089*** 0.7105
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel B: SR pension funds
Conditional Treynor-Mazuy model -0.0012*** 0.9137*** -0.5125*** 0.6780
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Conditional Merton-Henriksson model 0.0002 0.9719*** -0.1284*** 0.6783
 (0.571) (0.000) (0.000)
Panel C: Differences (conventional-SR)
Conditional TM 0.0005*** 0.0231 -0.0243
Conditional MH 0.0001*** 0.017 0.0195
eTable 5 shows the fund average OLS estimation of the conditional Treynor-Mazuy and Merton-Henriksson models, regres-
sions (5) and (6), for conventional pension funds (panel A) and SR pension funds (panel B) with domestic equity investment 
registered for sale in the UK. α0 represents the stock picking ability, β1 represents the risk-market exposure; and γ1 measures 
the market timing ability. Panel C shows the coefficient differences between conventional and SR pension funds. The associat-
ed p-values are shown beneath the coefficients estimated in brackets. The R-squared adjusted coefficient is also included for 
each of the models estimated. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Source: Own elaboration.
5.3. Style timing abilities
In this section, the timing abilities with regard to the different management styles de-
fined in the Fama and French (1993) and Carhart (1997) models are analyzed. Specifically, 
the multifactorial timing models (8) and (9) are implemented.
Table 6 exhibits these multifactoral timing model results. Panel A presents the results of 
the TM and MH extended versions for conventional pension funds. Panel B shows the same 
model results for SR funds. Panel C shows the differences between both funds (tested with a 
mean difference t-test). 
The stock-picking results are homogenous between models and funds, revealing a negative skill. 
The market exposure (β1) is similar in both conventional and SR pension funds. With regard to 
the style strategies, conventional and SR funds invest in small cap and growth values, in line with 
Ferruz et al. (2010). Nonetheless, the momentum strategies are diverse: absent or positive momen-
tum strategies in conventional funds (panel A), and contrarian momentum strategies in SR funds 
(panel B). Concerning market timing abilities, the results again show negative market-timing skill 
in conventional funds. However, the timing coefficient is positive in the TM-Carhart model and 
non-significant in the MH-Carhart for SR funds, which reveals some degree of superior market 
timing ability in SR managers. Additionally, all managers are able to time size strategies correctly 
(significantly positive γ2). The timing of the book-to-market factor is not clear (negative or positive 
skill in conventional funds, and positive or no skill in SR funds). The timing of the momentum factor 
is also inconclusive, although there is a generalized negative timing, especially in SR funds.
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As a result, conventional and SR pension fund managers develop similar investment 
strategies and present negative stock-picking skills, although their timing skills differ. SR 
pension funds are able to time correctly more strategies (market, size and book-to-market); 
thus, SR funds are able to adapt to the market and their investment strategies (investing 
in small versus large cap companies and in growth versus value stocks) at the correct 
moment. Investment in past poor performers (contrarian momentum strategies) leads SR 
funds to develop negative momentum timing.
5.4. The SR factor in the Carhart model
Table 7 shows the results of model (10) to measure the impact of the SR style on fund returns.
Table 7
Results of the model with SR risk factorg
 α0 β1 β2 β3 β4 β5 R2 adj
Conventional -0.0023*** 0.8721*** 0.3846*** -0.0601*** -0.0400*** 0.0503*** 0.7743
pension funds (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
SR pension 
funds
-0.0016*** 0.6807*** 0.5263*** -0.0455*** -0.1056*** 0.2456*** 0.7922
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Difference 
(conv-SR)
-0.0007*** 0.1914*** -0.1417*** -0.0146 0.0656*** -0.1953***
gTable 7 shows the fund average OLS estimation of model (10) for conventional pension funds and SR pension 
funds with domestic equity investment registered for sale in the UK, and their differences. α0 represents the alpha 
(performance of the model), β1 represents the risk-market exposure, β2 is the size factor (SMB) coefficient, β3 is the 
book-to-market factor (HML) coefficient, β4 is the momentum factor (PR1YR) coefficient, and β5 is the SR risk fac-
tor coefficient. The associated p-values are shown beneath the coefficients estimated in brackets. The R-squared 
adjusted coefficient is also included for each of the models estimated. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 
10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Source: Own elaboration.
As expected, SR pension funds have significantly positive loadings on the SR fac-
tor (β5). To observe the impact of this result on fund performance, the alpha coefficients 
are analyzed. The alpha is significantly negative in both funds and lower in conventional 
pension funds. Moreover, the alpha coefficient of the SR funds (Table 7) is significantly 
lower than the four-factor alpha (Table 3); specifically, -0.0011, implying that the SR risk 
factor influences the risk-adjusted returns, and the underperformance of SR pension funds 
appears to be driven by the SR risk, as Renneboog et al. (2008) find. Consequently, the 
SRI screening may constrain the risk-return optimization, although not excessively, since 
conventional funds are also unable to achieve positive performance.
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5.5. Bootstrap comparative analysis
In this section, a robustness test is implemented to verify that the previous results are 
not driven by the different sample sizes (145 SR funds versus 2,410 conventional funds). 
Following Fernández and Matallín (2008), a bootstrap method is applied, by forming 
10,000 random subsamples of size 145 from the total group of funds, excluding the SR 
pension funds. Then the average and the difference between this average and that of the SR 
pension funds are calculated. Table 8 displays the results.
Table 8
Bootstrapping results of the differences in performance and stock-picking abilities between 
conventional and SR pension fundsh
Differences in the alphas between the subsamples of conventional pension funds 
and SR funds in the following models:
p-value
CAPM 0.0004* 0.057
CARHART -0.0005*** 0.007
TM 0.0006*** 0.000
MH 0.0003** 0.017
hTable 8 represents the bootstrap results of the differences in performance and stock-picking abilities between 
conventional and SR pension funds. The performance is measured with the alphas of the CAPM and Carhart 
models and the stock-picking abilities are measured with the alphas of the Treynor-Mazuy (TM) and Merton-Hen-
riksson (MH) models. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.
Source: Own elaboration.
Table 8 collects the difference in performance and stock-picking abilities between con-
ventional funds (bootstrap coefficients) and SR pension funds. It should be noted (not 
reported) that both conventional and SR alpha coefficients are negative in the CAPM and 
Carhart models. However, the CAPM alpha is higher in conventional pension funds, and 
the Carhart performance alpha is higher in SR pension funds, leading to the positive and 
negative differences observed, respectively, in Table 8. On the other hand, the stock picking 
coefficients are significantly negative in both conventional and SR pension funds, although 
the stock-picking ability is less negative in conventional funds, which leads to positive 
differences (Table 8). Consequently, the generalized underperformance and negative se-
lectivity skills are line with the results attained in the prior sections, which indicates that 
the results are not driven by the size difference between the samples analyzed.
6. CONCLUSIONS
SRI has grown over recent decades, and financial instruments, such as SR mutual and 
SR pension funds have appeared. While most studies focus on mutual funds, the analysis 
of SR pension funds is an important topic of study because these products are both finan-
cial instruments and long-term savings vehicles, determining the future incomes of many 
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savers during retirement. Consequently, this paper examines whether socially responsible 
pension funds implement different strategies and achieve different levels of performance 
than conventional funds, contributing to developing more socially responsible pension out-
comes. Specifically, the performance, the styles, and the abilities of UK domestic equity 
pension fund managers (conventional and SR) are examined.
To date, only Ferruz et al. (2010) provide a comparative analysis of stock-picking and 
market timing abilities in pension funds. Accordingly, this analysis extends the existing 
literature on SR pension funds, with the results showing significantly negative performance 
and similar investment strategies in both conventional and SR pension funds. Specifical-
ly, the pension funds analyzed invest in small caps and growth stocks, and develop con-
trarian momentum strategies. Moreover, both types of fund present poor and negative 
stock-picking abilities and perverse market timing skills. Nonetheless, SR pension funds 
are able to correctly time more strategies (market, size, and book-to-market).
This study also controls for potential differences in style due to the SR component by 
introducing the SR risk factor in the model applied. The analysis shows that SR pension 
funds have significantly positive loadings of the SR factor, which erodes performance. As 
a result, the risk-return optimization of SR funds may be constrained by the fulfillment of 
specific SRI requirements.
Finally, a robustness test is carried out to confirm that the prior results are not driven 
by the size difference between both samples. A bootstrap analysis (forming subsamples of 
conventional funds) is applied and the results are compared between conventional and SR 
pension funds. The results are in line with prior outcomes, thus confirming the conclusions 
of the analysis.
It worth noting that significant differences between conventional and SR funds in per-
formance, style, and timing abilities are not found. Therefore, SR investors who base their 
investment decisions on social and personal values, achieve similar financial results and 
obtain more socially responsible pensions for retirement than conventional pension fund 
investors.
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